1	Attorney for Defendant	
2	Attorney for Defendant	
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		
8	SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA - COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO	
9		
10		
11) CASE NO. Plaintiff,	
12	DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION IN v. LIMINE TO INCLUDE EVIDENCE	
13) RELATED TO AN ADDITIONAL) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE;	
14) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND Defendants.) AUTHORITIES	
15) Date: April 13, 2009	
16) Time:) Dept.:	
17		
18		
19	To Plaintiff and its Counsel.	
20	To Plaintiff and its Counsel:	
21	Defendant respectfully moves this Court to allow the trier of fact to hear all of the	
22	following matters ["And," in a series, includes "and/or."]:	
23	Mention, discussion, testimony and any and all direct and indirect references to	
24	evidence of and any conduct or actions evidencing defendant's disability, his request for a	
25	reasonable accommodation and plaintiff's response to that request, as well as, evidence that	
26	supports defendant's affirmative defense of disability discrimination and plaintiff's failure to	
27	provide a reasonable accommodation of that disability.	
28		

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant filed his answer to plaintiff's complaint on February 23, 2009. At the time he responded he was not represented by counsel. The initial trial date in this action was Monday March 16, 2009. On Thursday March 12, 2009, defendant was diagnosed with a mental health disability by a licensed medical care provider. On Friday March 13, 2009, Defendant made a request for a reasonable accommodation based on a treatment plan developed by his medical provider that in her professional opinion would allow the defendant to remain in his housing and address the concerns of his landlord. On Friday March 13, 2009, the time period allowed for amending an answer by right had run. On March 18, 2009 defendant requested that plaintiff stipulate to allowing Defendant to amend his answer. Plaintiff denied this request. On March 19, 2009 and April 2, 2009 Defendant appeared on the law and motion ex parte calendar for an order shortening time on a motion for leave to amend defendant's answer to include defendant's affirmative defense of disability discrimination and plaintiff's failure to provide a reasonable accommodation of that disability. Specifically X sought the following affirmative defense be added to the Answer:

3f. Plaintiff is arbitrarily discriminating against Defendant because of disability.

3i(2). Defendant informed Plaintiff of his disability on March 13, 2009 and requested a reasonable accommodation. Plaintiff failed to reasonably accommodate defendant's disability. In so doing, Plaintiff has violated federal, state, and local law pertaining to disability discrimination. 1

On both occasions the order shorting time were denied because there was not time to set the hearing before the trial date. On April 3, 2009, Plaintiff's counsel was personally served defendant's motion for leave to amend defendant's answer to include defendant's affirmative defense of disability discrimination and plaintiff's failure to provide a reasonable accommodation of that disability. On April 6, 2009 Defendant requested a reasonable

¹ In addition, and consistent with this X First Amended Answer would check box 3f.

accommodation from Department 206 of the Superior Court of a trial protective date in two weeks to allow time for defendant's motion for leave to amend answer be heard. This request was denied. Defendant intends to request that the answer be amended as to conform to proof upon concluding the presentation of his case.

II. LEGAL ARGUMENT

California has a liberal public policy favoring the broad exercise of a court's discretion to permit amendment of pleadings. (*Atkinson v. Elk Corp.* (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 760; *Mabie v. Hyatt* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 581, 596.) Code of Civil Procedure Section 473 provides in pertinent part that this Court has the authority to allow a party, "upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding." (Cal. Code Civ.Proc § 473(a)(1).) Further, Code of Civil Procedure Section 470 states "where the variance is not material, as provided in Section 469, the court may direct the fact to be found according to the evidence, or may order an immediate amendment, without costs." (Cal. Code Civ.Proc § 470.) Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 469, "[n]o variance between the allegation in a pleading and the proof is to be deemed material, unless it has actually misled the adverse party to his prejudice in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits." (Cal. Code Civ.Proc § 469.)

Defendant's Narcissistic Personality Disorder is a disability/handicap that substantially limits at least one of his major life activities and which qualifies his for protection within the meaning of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA") and the Federal Fair Housing Act ("FHA"). (California Government Code § 12926.1(c); 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq; *In re Marriage of James and Christine C.* (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1273; *Auburn Woods I Homeowners Association v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission* (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1592.) Therefore, the defendant is deemed a "protected tenant" under both California and Federal law.

When a disabled tenant requests a reasonable accommodation, a landlord is legally required to actually respond thereto. As the Court explained in *Auburn Woods I, supra*, 121 Cal.App.4th at 1598, "[t]his obligation to 'open a dialogue' with a party requesting a reasonable

accommodation is part of the interactive process in which each party seeks and shares information." Moreover, "if a landlord is skeptical of a tenant's alleged disability or the landlord's ability to provide an accommodation, it is incumbent upon the landlord to request documentation or open a dialogue." (*Ibid.*) The Court concluded that a landlord "could not simply sit back and deny a request for reasonable accommodation because it did not think sufficient information had been presented or because it did not think the [tenant] had spoken the 'magic words' required to claim the protections of FEHA." (*Ibid.*) In this case, Plaintiff violated the rule articulated in *Auburn Woods I* when it failed to open a dialogue regarding Defendant's request for a reasonable accommodation.

FHA imposes the same obligation on a landlord. A violation of the FHA occurs when a disabled resident is denied a reasonable accommodation. (*Dubois v. Association of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua* (9th Cir. 2006) 453 F. 3d 1175, 1179.) The Ninth Circuit recently reiterated its position that "[w]e have repeatedly interpreted this language [FHA] as imposing an affirmative duty on landlords and public agencies to reasonably accommodate the needs of disabled individuals." (*McGary v. City of Portland (2004) 386 F.3d 1259, 1261*) (citations omitted)

Further, defendant's request for Reasonable Accommodation was timely and Plaintiff's duty to make a reasonable accommodation continues to exist. In Radeki v. Joura, 114 F.3d 115 (8th Cir. 1997), the tenant told the landlords that he was "ill" and needed more time to prepare for repairs and pest extermination in his apartment. The tenant had not cooperated with the landlords in allowing them access to his unit for repairs and for the elimination of cockroaches and mice. It was not until months later that the landlords were put on notice that the tenant suffered from severe depression. The court held that even though the landlords were not aware of the nature and extent of the tenant's disability when they served the notice, at the time they were made aware of the disability, they should have made a reasonable accommodation for the tenant's disabilities. Id. at 117. In this case, Defendant made a request for Reasonable

-4-

Accommodation on March 13, 2009 the same day he received written confirmation of his disability from a licensed health care professional and the day after he was diagnosed. Thus, when plaintiff became aware of defendant's disability and of his request for a reasonable accommodation, the duty to comply with the FHA still existed. This duty continues to exist and the plaintiff here has a present obligation to the tenant. Therefore, defendant's request is timely.

III. EVIDENCE OF DISABILITY AND DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR A REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION SHOULD BE ALLOWED

The Evidence Code of California defines admissible evidence as that which is relevant. Cal. Ev. Code §350. According to the Code, "Relevant evidence means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." Cal. Ev. Code §210. In this case, the Court should exercise its discretion to allow evidence regarding defendant's disability, his request for a reasonable accommodation and plaintiff's response to this request as it is relevant to both the incident alleged in the three day notice to quit and defendant's ability to raise a disability defense under both Federal and State law. First, Defendant's medical provider developed a reasonable accommodation and treatment plan that in her professional opinion would allow the defendant to remain in his housing and address the concerns of his landlord. Thus, there is a relationship between defendant's disability and plaintiff's allegations. Second, while defendant's request for a reasonable accommodation was timely under Federal law, its timing also precluded it from being included in defendant's in pro per answer. Finally, excluding this evidence will deny this disabled defendant the opportunity to exercise his Federally and State protected rights.

Therefore, evidence of defendant's disability, his request for a reasonable accommodation and plaintiff's response to this request defendant's disability, as well as any evidence which supports defendant's affirmative defense of disability discrimination and plaintiff's failure to provide a reasonable accommodation of that disability should be allowed as

1	it is directly related to allegations raised in plaintiff's pleadings and essential to protect this		
2	disabled defendant's Federally and State guaranteed rights.		
3	disabled defendant is redefany and state guaranteed rights.		
4	Dated: April 20, 2009	Respectfully submitted,	
5	2 4.00 . 1.25		
6			
7		Attornay for Defendant	
8		Attorney for Defendant	
9			
10			
11			
12			
13			
14			
15			
16			
17			
18			
19 20			
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			
26			
27			
28			